The uranium market is no longer a sleepy utility backwater—it's a geopolitical chessboard where governments are seizing the board, utilities are clinging to outdated playbooks, and a supply chasm yawns wider than the World Nuclear Association (WNA) ever dared forecast. In separate interviews, two uranium veterans—Dustin Garrow, a 50-year industry titan who has negotiated with Soviets, Kazakhs, and everyone in between, and Mike Alkin, the hedge fund manager who called the bottom in 2018—paint a picture of a sector in "nuclear future shock." Change is accelerating, inventories are evaporating, and the era of cheap, abundant uranium is dead. What follows is a synthesis of their insights into a coherent narrative of where the market stands, why utilities are losing the pricing war, and what it means for investors brave enough to navigate the greenfield minefield. 

1. From Utility Hesitation to Government Onshoring 

Dustin Garrow, fresh from the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) conference in Charleston, describes a seismic shift: the U.S. government is no longer a passive regulator—it's becoming an equity player in the nuclear fuel cycle. 

"The Trump administration is being very vocal about the need to onshore nuclear... reactors, fabrication, uranium conversion, enrichment. We're seeing new potential players... the sense in the industry was if the utilities were still the primary driver, we wouldn't be seeing this happen." – Dustin Garrow 

The evidence is mounting: 

• Cameco-Westinghouse $80 billion deal to build 10 AP1000 reactors, financed not by U.S. taxpayers but by Middle Eastern sovereign funds, Japan, and South Korea. 

• Bureau of the Interior fast-tracking Western land permits: "Bring us your proposed projects... we will process them much quicker." 

• Uranium as a U.S. critical mineral, opening the door to subsidies, loan guarantees, and potential government offtake. 

This is not incremental policy—it's a strategic reconfiguration. Garrow notes utilities remain scarred by Vogtle III/IV cost overruns and are content to operate reactors, not build them. The government is filling the void. Will utilities let Uncle Sam buy their uranium? Garrow doesn't rule it out: "The UEC proposed conversion plan... they're looking to the government to be involved.  

Mike Alkin sees this as the ultimate validation of structural deficits: "The world would go from woke to reality... from wind and solar kumbaya to 'we need base load.' All of a sudden demand is at 4–5% growth."  

The confluence is undeniable: data centers, reactor restarts, SMR hype, and now state capitalism. The WNA's 2025 market report—presented to a U.S. audience for the first time—shows a "monumental" uranium gap that dwarfs prior forecasts. Garrow: "The gap overwhelms existing production... it's become a real strong stimulus." 

1. The Russian Ban: A Non-Event Masking a Larger Crisis 

Seven weeks from the 2027 Russian uranium import ban, both experts agree: it's already baked in. 

• Russian contracts are naturally expiring. 

• Many U.S. utilities declined waivers to avoid PR fallout. 

• Rosatom is short feed material and can't fulfill all obligations anyway. 

"The Russian situation really wasn't brought up [at conferences]... it's gone to the back burner." – Dustin Garrow 

Overfeeding at Orano or Urenco? A myth. Alkin adds that Russian enrichment dominance (not uranium) was the real bottleneck—now being addressed by Centrus, Orano expansions, and new entrants like General Matter. The real story isn't Russia—it's China. Both note Beijing's surging uranium exports and potential Trump tariffs. The ban was a catalyst, but the real crunch begins in 2028–2030, when unfilled U.S. utility requirements jump from 11 million to 20 million pounds annually (DOE EIA data). 

1. Spot Market Theater: Where Traders Play, Utilities Watch  

The spot market—15% of transactions—is a sideshow, but one the investment world obsesses over. 

Source: UxC, TradeTech, expert estimates 

Garrow: "Spot seems to be settling in that 50–55 million pound range... volatility around a slowly rising price curve." 

Alkin: "The end user buys 8–10 million pounds in spot. The rest? Traders scalping 50 cents a pound."  

Key distortions: 

• Sprott/Yellowcake sequestration: ~90+ million lbs off-market. Neither is selling at $86. 

• Producer loans: Cameco's standby loans (likely from Asian utilities) avoid spot purchases that would spike prices. 

• BHP, Uzbekistan, juniors: Feed ~35–40M lbs/year into spot regardless of price. 

Alkin’s verdict: "We are so lucky as uranium investors—the world stares at [spot] while what matters is over here [term contracts]." 

1. Utility Denial: The Replacement Rate Collapse 

Since 2013, global utilities have replaced only 45% of consumed uranium annually—drawing down inventories to decade lows. 

"They've been sucking down these inventories... prices quadrupled, and they're still saying 'new mines will come online.'", Mike Alkin noted. 

Term contracting volumes are collapsing: 

• 2023: 160M lbs at ~$68/lb fixed 

• 2025 YTD: ~53M lbs at ~$86/lb fixed 

Yet 70% of contracts are market-related with: 

• Floors: mid-$70s 

• Ceilings: $130–$140s 

Producers prefer these—asymmetric upside. Utilities hate them but have no choice. Garrow sees 2026 as the inflection: "I need material starting in '28, '29... they're hearing what the supply side is saying." 

Alkin: "Fuel buyers tried to break the union. It failed."  

Tactics failing: 

1. Boycotting term market → prices rose anyway. 

1. Throwing bones to juniors (200k lbs at $75) → manipulates reported fixed price lower. 

1. Waiting for greenfields → delays, under-delivery, cost overruns. 

1. The Greenfield Reckoning: No Husab 2.0 in Sight 

The last major greenfield? Husab in 2016 (China). Before that? Langer Heinrich, Cigar Lake—20+ years ago. 

"The future is greenfield development... restarts are pretty much restarted.", Dustin Garrow stated. 

Viable projects (2030–2035) are scarce: 

Garrow’s math: Even if all hit targets, <40M lbs/year by 2032. WNA upper scenario needs 530M lbs by 2040—390M reference case. 

Alkin: "We model bringing them on... still tens of millions of pounds deficits annually." Brownfield reality check: Recent ISR restarts (Lost Creek, Nichols Ranch, etc.) delivering <50% of guidance at 2–3x capex. 

1. The Cost Curve Is Dead—Long Live the Incentive Price 

Centrus’s John Donelson in Charleston pointed out: "Prices support operation of current facilities... we are well short of incentivizing new capacity." 

Incentive prices (2025 USD): 

• ISR restarts: $70–$80/lb 

• Conventional restarts: $80–$90/lb 

• Greenfields (ISR): $90–$110/lb 

• Greenfields (open pit): $100–$130/lb 

• NexGen-scale: $120+/lb 

Reported $86 fixed price? Misleading. Hybrid contracts now embed $88–$90 defined components. Market-related contracts deliver at spot + premium in 3–5 years. 

1. Investment Implications: Torque vs. Treachery 

Alkin’s capital structure hierarchy: 

1. Physical uranium proxies (lowest risk, no mining dilution) 

1. Incumbent producers (Cameco, Kazatomprom) – power of incumbency 

1. Select developers (cash flow inflection) – e.g., Bannerman, Deep Yellow 

1. Exploration – high torque, high agency risk 

Garrow’s wildcard: Cameco as full-service fuel provider to Westinghouse (and beyond). Each AP1000 initial core = 2M lbs. 10 reactors = 20M lbs locked up. Rabbit Lake stays on the shelf. 

Landmines: 

• Agency risk: Most junior boards/management have <1% skin in the game. 

• ISR chemistry failures: "They couldn't get the chemistry right... costs materially higher." 

• Geopolitics: Niger, Greenland, Mauritania. 

• Exploration drought: 1970s deposits need fresh drilling, feasibility, financing. 

1. The ISR Mirage: Why “Easy” In-Situ Recovery Is Anything But 

Both experts warn that the industry’s love affair with ISR (in-situ recovery) is setting up a decade of disappointment. 

Alkin pointed out: “Everyone says ISR must be easy… But you have to really stay ahead of it because the depletion rates are so rapid. They’re like natural gas wells. They implode.” 

Garrow adds: “The Kazakhs do ISR at scale. But in the U.S.? The geology isn’t as forgiving. You’re seeing restarts deliver 30–50% of guidance at 2–3x the capex.” 

Real-world failures: 

• Lost Creek (Ur-Energy): 2024 production ~200k lbs vs. 600k guidance. 

• Nichols Ranch (Energy Fuels): Restart delayed 18 months; chemistry issues. 

• Lance (Peninsula Energy): $40M capex blowout; still not at nameplate. 

The math is brutal: 

• ISR wells cost $2–3M each to drill and maintain. 

• Depletion: 30–50% per year → constant reinvestment. 

• Recovery: 60–75% of resource (vs. 90%+ in Kazakhstan). 

Conclusion: ISR is capital-intensive, technically risky, and not a silver bullet. Greenfields using ISR (e.g., Wheeler River Phoenix) face the same demons—at scale. 

1. The Human Capital Crisis: The Old Guard Is Retiring, and No One Knows How to Mine Uranium 

Alkin drops a bombshell: “There’s a shortage of know-how people. The old CEOs are old. People do not know how to explore for or mine uranium.”  

The numbers tell the story: 

• Average age of uranium mine managers: 58+ (per WNA workforce survey). 

• Geologists with ISR experience: <200 globally outside Kazakhstan. 

• Last major U.S. uranium training program: Shut down in 1992. 

Case study: 

A major U.S. ISR restart hired a gold mining team. Result? 14 months of zero production due to pH imbalance—a rookie mistake. 

Garrow’s fix: “You need mentors. You need the guys who built McArthur River in the ’90s. But they’re 75 and on golf courses.” 

Investment angle: Companies with in-house uranium DNA (Cameco, Orano, Denison) trade at premiums for a reason. The rest? Caveat emptor. 

1. The AI Wildcard: How Many Pounds Does a ChatGPT Query Really Burn? 

Alkin is blunt: “If there were no SMRs or data centers, our thesis still works. It’s gravy.” 

But let’s quantify the gravy: 

Total “gravy”: 22–34M lbs/year by 2035—equivalent to one Rook I or two McArthur Rivers. 

The marginal ChatGPT query?  

• 1 query = ~0.3 Wh  

• 1 GW data center = 8.76 TWh/year  

• 1 TWh = ~400,000 lbs U3O8
  → 1 query = 0.00000012 lbs U3O8
  (But 1 billion queries/day = 44 lbs/year—still trivial. It’s the infrastructure that matters.) 

1. The Kazatomprom Paradox: The World’s Swing Producer Is Swinging… Downward 

Kazatomprom’s Q3 2025 results (released Nov 2025): 

• Production: -2% YoY (sulfuric acid shortages) 

• Guidance: 2025 flat, 2026 –5% 

• Loans to Cameco: +2M lbs (avoiding spot buys) 

Alkin: “The scale is small vs. deficits. But it delays price discovery.” 

Garrow: “They’re not doing grassroots exploration. They’re slapping up depletion curves.” 

Translation: The world’s largest producer is not growing—and can’t. The future is greenfields or bust. 

1. The Endgame: When Do Utilities Break? 

Garrow’s 2026 prediction: “May, Q1 2026. If the market’s still under $90, they’ll test. But if it’s $95+, panic sets in.” 

Alkin’s trigger: “When a major U.S. utility issues an RFP for 5M lbs starting 2029 at any price. That’s the white flag.” 

Both agree:  

• First capitulation: Q2 2026  

• Spot price peak: $120–$150 (2027–2028)  

• Incentive price for greenfields: $110+ sustained 

Conclusion: The Uranium Fairy Is Dead 

The uranium market has entered a bifurcated reality: 

• Public narrative: Spot volatility, Kazakh hiccups, junior hype. 

• Structural truth: Government onshoring, inventory exhaustion, greenfield scarcity, utility capitulation. 

"The utilities can't burn a stock certificate. They need yellowcake in a drum.". Dustin Garrow noted. 

The WNA's 1.125 billion pound cumulative deficit to 2040 is not a forecast—it's a starting point. Add AI data centers, SMRs, and life extensions? Gravy. The base case is already catastrophic for utilities. 

For investors, the message is clear: This is not 2007. There is no China to build 50 mines. There is no inventory parachute. There is only price. 

The uranium bull market is not climbing a wall of worry—it's climbing a wall of denial. And the higher it climbs, the harder the fuel buyers fall. 

Final Thought (Alkin): “We’re in the 3rd inning of a 9-inning game. The 7th-inning stretch? That’s when the lights go out in a reactor because the fuel buyer waited too long.” 

Watch both interviews;

Disclaimer: This article is not a recommendation to buy any shares, products, or services. Always conduct your due diligence and consult with a financial advisor.