“The future isn’t knowable with certainty, and relying on predictions of what will happen is dangerous. Investing is about dealing with probabilities, not certainties. Successful investors attempt to understand where we are in the cycle and how the probabilities are shifting.” Howard Marks, Mastering the Market Cycle: Getting the Odds on Your Side, 2018.

In finance, everything is always a “what if”; nothing that has not yet occurred is ever truly certain, and even what has already taken place retains a margin of instability, a lingering sense of fragility that cannot be ignored. In the mining sector, this reality is dramatically amplified: dozens of random and unpredictable factors play a decisive role in shaping final outcomes, and unexpected events continuously affect companies in every direction, both positively and negatively.

In the uranium sector, this dynamic reaches an even higher level of intensity. It is an extraordinarily complex and layered industry, governed by stringent regulations and exposed to technical, political, environmental, and geopolitical risks: Global Atomic is certainly no exception.

The future of the company depends on two main factors. On one hand, its ability to fully finance the construction of the Dasa Project; on the other, its capacity to operate within a delicate and complex political environment such as that of the current Nigerien military government, while maintaining stable and profitable operations for shareholders over the coming decades.

Since the entire geopolitical and domestic political dimension has already been addressed in the previous article “GLOBAL ATOMIC AND NIGER: URANIUM’S GEOPOLITICAL STAKES IN CENTRAL AFRICA”, which aimed to provide the analytical tools needed to build a probability distribution around internal political risk, the objective of this study is to focus on the project itself: to understand where things truly stand today and what its intrinsic value might be under multiple future scenarios.

On Thursday, December 11 2025, a fundamental turning point was reached on the financing front of the Dasa Project, with the publication of a corporate update stating that the bank “has confirmed that funding of the Dasa Project was reviewed at a meeting of the Bank’s Credit Committee and forwarded to the Investment Committee for review”.

This wording initially generated some interpretative uncertainty, particularly around the use of the term forwarded, which for some did not necessarily imply a formal approval. However, consistent evidence shows that, in standard financial-institution practice, the transition from the Credit Committee to the Investment Committee occurs only after the financing has been approved by the Credit Committee.

This interpretation was further confirmed through direct contact with Global Atomic, which clarified that the communication represents formal confirmation that the most critical step has been successfully completed, with the process advancing to the subsequent phase aimed at finalizing the funding.

The work carried out by the Credit Committee is, in fact, the longest and most complex phase of the entire process. At this stage, all possible investment scenarios are analyzed in depth, technical, financial, and geopolitical risks are assessed, and the necessary documentation is gathered to build a comprehensive and coherent view of the project. It is also important to emphasize that the various committees do not operate in isolation: they are part of the same financial institution and maintain continuous communication. As a result, both the Investment Committee and the board of directors are already fully aware of the nature of the dossier they are expected to review.

Furthermore a rejection at a later stage would entail a very high reputational cost for the Credit Committee itself; for this reason, in practice, only projects with a reasonable expectation of a positive outcome are forwarded to the Investment Committee. This dynamic is corroborated by the fact that almost all of the projects approved by the Credit Committee ultimately proceed to final funding.

While it remains true that absolute certainty never exists until an event has fully materialized, it is equally fair to state that, after more than two years of waiting, the most significant milestone on the path toward the construction and commissioning of the Dasa Project has finally been reached.

Returning to the opening quote of this article, it therefore becomes essential to understand where we stand in the cycle and how probabilities are evolving. Ignoring this aspect risks missing one of the rarest and most asymmetric opportunities currently available in the sector. The aim of the entire analysis is precisely to understand the intrinsic value of the project and to compare it with individual probability distributions assigned to future events, in order to attribute a concrete value to what is arguably the most discussed uranium company of the moment.

The core point is therefore this: attempting to estimate the current value of the Dasa Project as a function of both the possible future conditions of the uranium market—reflected in different price scenarios—and the company’s actual productive and operational capacity.

A significant portion of this analysis is based on the Feasibility Study published by the company, which represents the primary technical and economic foundation for the valuation work presented here.

The study, prepared by METC Engineering (Pty) Ltd and effective as of February 28, 2024, offers a thorough and well-structured assessment of the Dasa Project, grounded in established engineering practice and supported by on-site work, technical analysis, and preliminary economic modelling. As explicitly stated in the report, the conclusions are intended to be prudent and realistic within the scope of a feasibility-level study, while naturally reflecting the uncertainties inherent to projects at this stage of development.

In a sector where early-stage developers often rely on corporate presentations highlighting optimistic NPVs, exceptionally low operating costs, minimal risk, and aggressive construction timelines, (frequently without the support of a fully articulated engineering study) the availability of a comprehensive Feasibility Study represents a meaningful advantage for investors. It offers a transparent and verifiable framework on which to build a disciplined intrinsic valuation, rather than relying on promotional assumptions.

Given the breadth of the Feasibility Study, only selected elements are referenced in this analysis for reasons of focus and efficiency.

1.0 Capex

The starting point of the intrinsic analysis of the Dasa Project was to gain a clear understanding of its total cost structure.
While the market environment—and therefore market prices—does not depend on the company, project costs represent the core of its economic viability, as they encompass what is largely under the company’s control and are closely linked to the quality of the deposit.

Two categories of costs were analyzed. The first includes the pre-production expenditures required to bring the mine into operation, namely CAPEX. The second comprises all operating costs that the company will incur throughout the entire life of the mine, which will ultimately determine its profitability over time.

Below is the table from the Feasibility Study detailing all pre-production costs required to build and bring the Dasa mine into operation.

Table 1: Capex of the Dasa project as of 2023

The total cost of the processing plant amounts to approximately $96 million. When considering the entire project infrastructure, the total cost required to bring the mine into production reaches $375.5 million, excluding working capital. It is important to note that a specific contingency percentage was applied to each cost item in order to keep the study as realistic as possible: unforeseen events and cost overruns are commonplace in the mining sector. The total contingency applied to an initial CAPEX of $338 million amounts to $37 million, representing nearly 11% of the total.

In company presentations and in the Feasibility Study, the figure of $308 million for total CAPEX frequently appears. The reason for this discrepancy is that, at the time of publication of the Feasibility Study, sunk cost (costs already incurred) amounted to $67.2 million. For the same reason, the company also refers to a CAPEX of $308 million in its presentations, as the Net Present Value calculations contained in the engineering study were based on the costs still to be incurred at that time, namely $308 million.

At the end of 2024, the company disclosed in its annual report that it expected an increase in CAPEX due to inflation of approximately $24 million, bringing the total to around $398 million. This represents an increase of roughly 5%, which is in line with the inflationary impact observed across the mining sector, while remaining at the lower and of that range; that’s a relatively rare case of transparent disclosure on a topic that is often overlooked by peer companies.

The next step of the analysis was to determine how much of the total CAPEX has already been spent to date. Assessing the progress of project expenditures is crucial for several reasons: it allows an understanding of how much capital the company still needs to raise through the DFC and/or joint ventures, and it enables the development of updated and reliable Net Present Value calculations, which are highly sensitive to the remaining CAPEX.

Moreover, a detailed reconstruction makes it possible to estimate the company’s monthly cash consumption, providing a more linear and realistic framework for anticipating potential future capital raises. Finally, and no less importantly, it allows an assessment of how much of the capital raised is actually being deployed toward mine development, as opposed to excessive general and administrative expenses—a common issue among many early-stage developers in this sector.

To accurately reconstruct the amount of CAPEX already incurred and the capital still required to complete the Dasa Project, a detailed reconciliation exercise was carried out by cross-referencing all annual and quarterly reports published by the company starting from the date of publication of the Feasibility Study and the available bloomberg data. This established a clear and verifiable baseline for the analysis.

Subsequently, CAPEX evolution was tracked quarter by quarter by systematically comparing changes in reported cash balances with the qualitative and quantitative information provided by management.

At the time of publication of the Feasibility Study, cumulative project costs already sustained amounted to $67.2 million. By the end of 2024, total CAPEX spent had reached approximately $124 million. Applying the same reconstruction methodology, by the end of the third quarter of 2025 cumulative spending stood at approximately $170–175 million, implying that more than $50 million of CAPEX was deployed during the first three quarters of 2025 alone.

Based on these figures, the remaining CAPEX required to complete mine construction can be estimated in a range between $215 million and $220 million. An additional 5% prudential buffer was applied to account for expected inflation and potential cost increases during 2025. Including this margin, the total capital required to fully complete the construction of the Dasa Project is estimated at approximately $230 million.

1.1 Cash burn rate, liquidity position and the role of warrants

Importantly, the vast majority of the company’s cash burn is directly allocated to project development, as CAPEX outlays closely mirror overall cash consumption once essential G&A expenses are excluded, with the latter remaining significantly lower than those of comparable peers.
By analyzing the frequency and size of all capital increases carried out by Global Atomic over the current year, it emerges that the company’s cash consumption currently stands at approximately $5.5 million per month.

Figure 1: Cash burn rate of Global Atomic

While the end-of-quarter figures highlighted in yellow represent confirmed positions, the end-of-month figures shown in white are estimates.

Following the most recent capital increase, the company should therefore have approximately four and a half months of financial runway starting from the end of October, with coverage estimated until mid-March 2026, thus extending through almost the entire first quarter.

This assessment naturally assumes that Global Atomic maintains its current pace of capital consumption, a pace that, in all likelihood, does not represent the maximum construction speed. It is nevertheless reasonable to conclude that, until project financing is finalized in full, the company will remain cautious and will seek to minimize recourse to further equity raises as much as possible.

Having now reached approval of the financing at the DFC Credit Committee level, and with the company having communicated an estimated two-month timeframe for completion of the remaining approval process, it is possible to infer that Global Atomic will need to sustain its current liquidity at least until mid-February 2026.

Even in the event that a definitive agreement with the DFC were finalized—and even more so if the financing were to come from a joint venture—the time elapsed between signing the agreement and the actual disbursement of funds into the company’s accounts would not be immediate. Several weeks would typically be required due to regulatory requirements and unavoidable bureaucratic procedures.

Despite ongoing speculation suggesting that the company may be preparing for another capital increase to address near-term funding needs, such an outcome is far from certain. In light of historical approval rates for projects that successfully pass the Credit Committee stage, it is important to seriously consider the possibility of a positive conclusion to the financing agreements with the DFC.

Within this context, another often-overlooked factor comes into play: the additional liquidity potentially generated through the exercise of warrants accumulated across the various capital increases carried out over the past two years. These warrants typically carry an exercise window of up to 36 months from the date of the capital increase that originated them.

Below is therefore provided the complete list of all warrants that are currently still exercisable, all of which stem from capital increases executed by the company in recent years.

Table 2: All warrants exercisable as of December 2025

In the event that Global Atomic’s share price were to exceed the 0.80 CAD threshold, only the warrants with a strike price equal to or below that level would be exercised. Under this scenario, the exercise of the 0.62 CAD and 0.80 CAD tranches would generate a total cash inflow of approximately USD 39.3 million for the company, representing a first and immediate source of additional liquidity.

Should the share price instead rise above 1.20 CAD, the warrant tranches with strike prices of 1.00 CAD and 1.20 CAD would also become exercisable. In this case, when combined with the lower-strike tranches already exercisable, the total liquidity potentially raised by Global Atomic would increase to approximately USD 95.9 million, significantly strengthening the company’s financial position.

Finally, in a more favorable scenario in which the share price reaches or exceeds 1.80 CAD, all remaining higher-strike warrants still outstanding would also be exercised, including those at 1.35 CAD, 1.50 CAD, and 1.80 CAD. In this context, the full exercise of all outstanding warrant tranches would generate a total cash inflow of approximately USD 152.7 million for the company.

It is evident that the progressive exercise of these warrants would result in a substantial increase in the number of shares outstanding, potentially rising by a total of 194 million shares, and therefore represents a meaningful dilution for existing shareholders, an outcome that is clearly not desirable in isolation. This dynamic must however be interpreted within the broader context of the past 18 months, during which the company has operated from a position of increasing disadvantage vis-à-vis the market, in the absence of concrete financing news and amid a deterioration of the geopolitical environment affecting relationships with traditional Western partners. Under these conditions, the inclusion of warrants as part of capital raises became a forced but common practice in the mining development space: far from ideal, but by no means unusual.

That said, the central aspect of this dynamic lies in the quality and flexibility of the liquidity generated. A potential cash inflow of up to approximately USD 153 million would provide Global Atomic with a highly meaningful operational buffer during the transition phase leading to the disbursement of project financing, substantially eliminatingthe risk of having to resort to further equity raises under unfavorable market conditions, precisely at the most critical stage of the project’s development.

At the same time, these resources would give the company the ability to accelerate the development of the Dasa Project, finance the expansion of the resource base through new exploration activities, evaluate an increase in production capacity over the medium term, or—under more advanced and favorable circumstances—implement capital allocation strategies aimed at shareholder value creation, including potential share buyback programs, as repeatedly suggested by management. In this context, the exercise of the warrants should not be viewed merely as a source of dilution, but rather as a powerful tool for self-financing and strategic optionality for the company.

In summary, the key figures to keep in mind are the following: approximately USD 230 million of remaining CAPEX still required for the development of the project, a recent average cash consumption of around USD 5.5 million per month, current liquidity that should allow the company to operate until the end of March 2026, and finally up to approximately USD 150 million of potential additional liquidity deriving from the full exercise of the outstanding warrants.

1.2 NPV calculation of the Dasa Project under multiple scenarios

The core of this analysis lies precisely in recalculating the intrinsic value of the Dasa Project across the scenarios that, as of today, appear the most conservative and closest to the current environment.
Fortunately, the Feasibility Study provides a detailed year-by-year breakdown of the mine’s economics across its entire life.

Table 3: Economic overview of the Dasa Project across the entire LoM as published in the Feasibility Study

This made it possible to retrieve all cost items (of every nature), as well as taxes, royalties, and so on, and to adapt and adjust them according to the scenarios selected for this study.
As usual, the objective has been to build highly conservative cases. For this reason, scenarios with uranium prices above $150-200/lb will not be presented, even though price levels of that magnitude are far from impossible over the life of the mine.
The assumptions embedded in the Feasibility Study are themselves very conservative; consequently, none of the cases considered in the study includes the more optimistic outcomes repeatedly mentioned by management as potential future scenarios for the project. In particular, the Feasibility Study does not incorporate inferred resources, not even under the repeatedly stated (and, according to the company, likely) scenario in which they are converted into mineral resources, supported by an updated economic study, and paired with an increase in production to 4 million pounds per year through the end of mine life.
Likewise, this analysis does not consider an expansion of the uranium processing plant’s capacity, which could lead to a meaningful increase in annual production and a corresponding shortening of mine life in the absence of new discoveries that expand the company’s overall resource inventory.
In addition, the Feasibility Study does not consider the potential upside associated with an expansion of economically mineable resources driven by a reduction in the cut-off grade. As detailed in the study, Mineral Resources and mine planning assumptions are based on an underground mining cut-off grade of approximately 1,480–1,500 ppm U₃O₈, derived from uranium price assumptions in the range of $50–70/lb. At current and higher uranium price levels, a lower cut-off grade could become economically viable, allowing portions of the resource currently below the reporting threshold to be profitably extracted.
Finally, none of the scenarios assumes a progressive increase in the uranium price over the life of the mine, in line with the conservative pricing framework adopted in the Feasibility Study. A constant price has been applied across the full 24-year horizon, in clear contrast with what is currently emerging from the long-term market. While this assumption has a material impact on the company’s potential earnings since future price increases would likely be reflected during contract negotiations, especially given the structural dynamics of the global uranium market, where bargaining power appears to be shifting gradually from utilities to producers. This effect has been intentionally excluded in order to preserve an extremely conservative approach and to provide a snapshot of the Dasa Project NPV under three simple market scenarios that remain close to today’s conditions.
Conversely, no escalation of operating costs has been included over the life of the mine (in line with the FS), unlike the inflation adjustment applied to CAPEX. This choice is based on the assumption that any future increase in the commodity price would be able to offset—and more than compensate for—higher operating costs; if that were not the case, investing in this sector would lose much of its economic rationale. In addition, operating costs were left unchanged in order to remain fully consistent with the Feasibility Study, which provides a detailed and year-by-year cost schedule over the entire life of the mine. Introducing additional inflation assumptions on operating costs would have reduced comparability and deviated from the engineering-based framework of the FS.

The scenarios analyzed therefore focus on two macro-categories. The first assumes a declining production profile over the life of the mine, based exclusively on current mineral resources. The second assumes a steady-state production of 4 million pounds per year, which presupposes the conversion of inferred resources into a higher-confidence category.

I consider the first scenario to be highly conservative, both because the company deems the conversion of approximately 50 million pounds of inferred resources to be likely, and because the ore body has not yet been fully delineated. In addition, positive results are expected from the ongoing exploration activities within the Dasa Project area and in the adjacent zones currently under concession to the company.

It is also worth recalling that a further expansion of the resource portfolio accompanied by an updated Feasibility Study would not be unprecedented. In March 2023, the resource base was already expanded by approximately 50%, supported by an updated economic study.

The significant revenues generated in the early years are plausibly intended to be reinvested precisely into resource expansion and into the growth of production and overall productivity.

It is therefore reasonable to expect positive developments from a study carried out in 2023 on a mine that, once constructed and operational, is expected to operate from 2028 to 2051.

1.2.1 NPV under declining production profile

In the first case, production follows the most conservative production profile outlined in the Feasibility Study, peaking in 2034–2035 at 4.9 million pounds before gradually declining to approximately 1.5–1.0 million pounds per year in the final years of operation.

The calculations for this scenario are straightforward, as variations in uranium prices affect only revenues, royalties, and taxes, while operating costs remain unchanged. In this framework, the base case is clearly uranium priced at 85 USD per pound, which corresponds to the long-term market price for base and escalated contract types. While these contracts represent only a minority of the long-term market (approximately 30%), they nevertheless constitute the only concrete and publicly observable reference available to investors.

From a conservative standpoint, the three price scenarios considered were therefore limited to 85 USD, 95 USD, and 110 USD per pound.

After replicating the Feasibility Study table corresponding to the base case of 75 USD per pound, the necessary calculations were performed to translate the same framework into the different price levels.

Revenues

With respect to revenues, it was essential to account for the fact that 47.5% of production during the first five years is already under contract. While the Feasibility Study does not disclose the exact price levels of these contracts, it does state that, in the event of market pricing at 95 USD per pound, the company would receive 81 USD per pound for the already contracted volumes.

For the 95 USD per pound scenario, revenue calculations were therefore relatively straightforward and did not require additional assumptions. A simple weighted average was applied over the first five years, with 52.5% of production sold at 95 USD per pound and 47.5% sold at 81 USD per pound, resulting in an average realized price of approximately 89 USD per pound for that initial period. This represents a strong outcome and reflects a pre-contracting strategy that was not driven by distress but rather executed with discipline, as the company would still capture roughly 93% of the prevailing market price during the first five years.

For the other two scenarios—85 USD per pound and 110 USD per pound—and using the most transparent benchmark explicitly described in the Feasibility Study for the first five years, the following effective realized prices were derived. In the 85 USD scenario, the company would realize approximately 95% of the market price, or about 80 USD per pound, during the first five years. In the 110 USD scenario, again for the first five years, the realized price would be approximately 90% of the market price, corresponding to about 99 USD per pound.

For the remainder of the mine life, revenues were calculated simply by multiplying the millions of pounds produced in each year by the market price assumed under the relevant scenario.

Taxes and royalties
With respect to royalties, the calculation was straightforward: for each year, 6.993% of revenues was applied, consistently with the economic results reported in the Feasibility Study.

The treatment of taxes, however, is more nuanced and reflects the combined effect of two distinct mechanisms.

As shown in the economic schedule corresponding to the 75 USD/lb base case, SOMIDA does not pay corporate income taxes to the Nigerien government during the first five years of operation. This outcome is driven, first, by the standard tax shield associated with capital expenditures, whereby the significant upfront CAPEX invested in mine construction is progressively offset against future taxable profits, as is typical for mining projects.

In addition to this conventional mechanism, a second, project-specific factor applies. Under the legal agreements between Global Atomic and the Government of Niger, the latter holds a 20% equity interest in the project, of which 10% is carried. This structure implies that, over the life of the mine, the government is responsible for contributing 10% of both capital and operating costs.

In practice, however, the full CAPEX has been and will be advanced by Global Atomic. The government’s carried share of these costs is therefore recovered by the company through deductions against future tax liabilities.

The combined effect of standard capital cost recovery and the carried-interest tax credits results in approximately 800 million USD of pre-tax cash flow being effectively shielded from taxation. Accordingly, in all scenarios considered in this analysis, the first 800 million USD of taxable income is treated as non-taxable for the purpose of calculating post-tax cash flows.

Once this threshold is exceeded, taxation is applied in line with the Feasibility Study assumptions, using a 30% tax rate on pre-tax cash flows.

After deducting all costs, royalties, and taxes, the resulting figure is the post-tax cash flow, which represents the key input for the calculation of the project’s Net Present Value.

Once all final results were obtained, the Net Present Value of the project was calculated for each of the scenarios considered by discounting all post-tax cash flows at an 8% discount rate, summing the discounted values and finally subtracting the remaining CAPEX required to bring the project into production. This residual CAPEX is significantly lower than that assumed in the Feasibility Study, having been reduced from 308 million USD to approximately 230 million USD.

NPV

At this stage, it is necessary to clearly distinguish between two conceptually different, yet complementary, levels of analysis.
The first is the Net Present Value of the Dasa Project at the project level, which represents the fundamental metric for assessing the overall economic profitability of the mine. This value reflects the entirety of post-tax net cash flows generated by the asset and accrues entirely to the operating company, SOMIDA. Although Global Atomic holds an 80% interest in the project and the Government of Niger the remaining 20%, it is important to emphasize that 100% of the project cash flows are initially generated and retained within SOMIDA, where they are fully allocated to the maintenance, development, and growth of the Dasa mine. This includes not only ongoing operations, but also potential additional exploration activities, expansions of productive capacity, sustaining capital investments, and other strategic initiatives directly related to the project. Only at the point of dividend distribution do these cash flows exit the operating entity, with 20% accruing to the Government of Niger and 80% to Global Atomic.

In parallel, from a valuation and equity-level perspective, it is equally important to understand the share of annual net profits attributable to Global Atomic and the net present value of the cash flows accruing to the company over the entire life of the mine.

For this reason, two distinct Net Present Values were calculated. First, the Net Present Value of the project itself, obtained by discounting the total net cash flows of the Dasa Project and subtracting the residual CAPEX required to initiate production:

Figure 2: NPV calculation of the Dasa Project

where CF_(Project,t) represents the post-tax net cash flow of the project in year t, r is the discount rate (8%), T is the mine life, and CAPEX_Remaining denotes the residual capital still to be invested.

Subsequently, the Net Present Value attributable to Global Atomic was also calculated by discounting 80% of the annual post-tax net cash flows accruing to the company based on its equity stake, using the same discount rate and keeping the treatment of the residual CAPEX unchanged, as this is already embedded in the project cash-flow structure:

Figure 3: NPV calculation of Global Atomic’s share of the Dasa Project

This approach makes it possible to clearly and consistently separate the economic value of the Dasa Project as an industrial asset from the economic value of the cash flows attributable to Global Atomic as a shareholder, while at the same time maintaining full methodological consistency in the treatment of cash flows, CAPEX, and fiscal effects.
The Net Present Value calculations discount all future cash flows to the first year of production, consistently with the methodology adopted in the March 2024 Feasibility Study. Based on the most recent statements by the company, the start of production is expected to occur between 2027 and 2028; accordingly, 2028 has been selected as year 0 in the NPV formulas.

Accordingly, the following tables reproduce structures similar to those presented in the Feasibility Study, illustrating the economic performance of the Dasa Project and the resulting NPV outcomes, together with the underlying cash flow dynamics, under the three selected price scenarios for the first macro-case of declining production.

Table 4: Economic results at 85$/lbs

Table 5: NPV results at 85$/lbs

In the most conservative scenario, with a uranium price of $85/lb, the Dasa Project is nonetheless able to generate solid and well-distributed cash flows over time. Annual post-tax project cash flows reach their highest levels during the full production phase, with values in the range of USD 215–260 million per year in the central years of the mine life, before gradually declining in line with the natural depletion of production. The average post-tax cash flow over the life of mine remains at USD 104 million.

Considering the ownership structure of the project, the share of net cash flows attributable to Global Atomic (80%) follows a similar profile, with annual contributions exceeding USD 170–200 million during the phase of full production plateau and full tax relief, before progressively decreasing in the later years.

Within this framework, the Net Present Value of the Dasa Project amounts to approximately USD 1.26 billion, while the Net Present Value attributable to Global Atomic’s stake stands at around USD 959 million. These figures are already significantly higher than the reference NPV historically communicated by the company based on a uranium price of $75/lb, confirming that even the most conservative market scenario results in a highly value-accretive outcome.

Table 6: Economic results at 95$/lbs

Table 7: NPV results at 95$/lbs

With a uranium price of $95/lb, the economic profile of the Dasa Project strengthens further, translating into materially higher and more resilient cash flow generation. Annual post-tax project cash flows reach peaks of approximately USD 250–290 million during the production plateau phase, while the contribution from the early years is further enhanced by the favorable tax regime. The average post-tax cash flow over the life of the mine remains at USD 121 million per year.

The share of net cash flows attributable to Global Atomic fully reflects this improvement, with annual contributions in the range of USD 200–230 million during periods of maximum profitability.

Under this scenario, the Net Present Value of the Dasa Project increases to approximately USD 1.46 billion, while the Net Present Value attributable to Global Atomic’s stake reaches around USD 1.12 billion. The increase relative to the $85/lb scenario is substantial and places the Dasa Project within a particularly attractive profitability range, even from a long-term perspective and in comparison with peer projects across the sector.

Table 8: Economic results at 110$/lbs

Table 9: NPV results at 110$/lbs

In the most favorable scenario, with a uranium price of $110/lb, the increase in revenues is reflected almost entirely in net cash flows, with no structural changes on the cost side. Annual post-tax project cash flows reach levels close to USD 280–340 million during the phase of maximum profitability, highlighting an extremely robust cash generation profile. The average post-tax cash flow over the life of the mine stands at USD 146 million per year.

The Global Atomic share fully benefits from this scenario, with annual cash flows exceeding USD 220–270 million during the most profitable years of the mine’s life.

In this context, the Net Present Value of the Dasa Project increases to approximately USD 1.79 billion, while the Net Present Value attributable to Global Atomic’s stake reaches around USD 1.39 billion. This outcome clearly illustrates the project’s strong exposure to a structurally rising uranium market, effectively doubling the historical NPV based on a $75/lb uranium price and further reinforcing the project’s overall economic attractiveness.

1.2.2 NPV under steady-state production of 4 mlbs per annum

In this case, the calculation could not be as linear as in the previous scenario: changing annual production levels directly affects the absolute cost figures, which therefore cannot be assumed to remain unchanged. In the absence of an updated engineering study defining a revised mine plan and extraction sequence under a steady-state production profile, estimating new absolute costs would be largely arbitrary.
For this reason, the most methodologically sound and conservative approach was to rely on the unit costs per pound already estimated in the Feasibility Study. These costs are calculated year by year and already reflect the progressive extraction of different portions of the orebody, including the natural increase in unit costs observed in the later stages of the mine life as more complex and less accessible material is processed.
Under a constant production scenario, while the timing of extraction changes, the underlying characteristics of the deposit do not. Maintaining the same cost per pound therefore represents a neutral and prudent assumption, avoiding the introduction of unverified efficiencies or speculative economies of scale. Should the company release an updated economic study detailing the cost structure of additional resources or higher production levels, the analysis can be readily revised accordingly.

Table 10: First set of costs pre-royalties

Table 11: Second set of costs post-EBITDA and pre-tax

Once the costs per pound were obtained, recalculating the NPVs became straightforward: all the assumptions and methodological choices previously applied to revenues, royalties, and taxation were maintained unchanged in this scenario as well.
The only additional distinction introduced was the exclusion of working capital as a modeling variable, given that, under a steady production profile over most of the mine life, its evolution is not directly inferable and would introduce unnecessary noise into the valuation.

Table 12: Economic results at 85$/lbs

Table 13: NPV results at 85$/lbs

In the most conservative case, with a uranium price of 85 $/lb, maintaining a constant production of 4 million pounds per year until the end of mine life significantly alters the project’s economic profile compared with the Feasibility Study scenario. Post-tax cash flows are less concentrated in the very early years, but display greater regularity and visibility across the entire life of the mine, with a peak ranging between USD 200–260 million (of which USD 165–210 million attributable to Global Atomic) during the first phase of full production plateau and total tax relief. The average post-tax cash flow over the life of the mine remains equal to USD 129 million.

Under this scenario, the Net Present Value of the Dasa Project amounts to approximately USD 1.40 billion, confirming that a higher and more stable production strategy is still capable of preserving substantial value creation even in a conservative pricing environment. Considering the 80% ownership stake held by Global Atomic, the share of annual post-tax cash flows attributable to the company follows the same smooth temporal profile, while the Net Present Value of Global Atomic’s share is approximately USD 1.08 billion.

Table 14: Economic results at 95$/lbs

Table 15: NPV results at 95$/lbs

With a uranium price of 95 $/lb, the project’s post-tax cash flows are distributed relatively evenly over most of the mine life, generally ranging between USD 140–190 million per year, with a peak in the order of USD 250–300 million (of which USD 190–240 million attributable to Global Atomic) during the two-year period characterized by a full production plateau and the most favorable tax regime. The average post-tax cash flow over the life of the mine remains equal to USD 157 million per year.

In this context, the Net Present Value of the Dasa Project increases to approximately USD 1.73 billion, reflecting not only the higher uranium selling price but also the benefit of a more uniform and less volatile cash generation profile over time. Global Atomic’s 80% share of annual net cash flows follows the same stable dynamic, while the Net Present Value of Global Atomic’s share reaches approximately USD 1.34 billion.

Table 16: Economic results at 110$/lbs

Table 17: NPV results at 110$/lbs

With a uranium price of 110 $/lb, maintaining the production plateau through to end of life allows the project to express a particularly robust, continuous, and resilient value creation profile. Annual post-tax cash flows remain consistently within a range of USD 160–210 million, with a peak reaching USD 280–345 million (of which USD 220–280 million attributable to Global Atomic) during the two-year period of maximum production intensity and full tax relief. The average post-tax cash flow over the life of the mine remains equal to USD 193 million per year.

In this scenario, the Net Present Value of the Dasa Project reaches approximately USD 2.14 billion, clearly highlighting how, in the presence of a structurally tighter uranium market, a steady-state production strategy represents a particularly effective trade-off between maximizing present value and reducing operational risk. Global Atomic’s share of annual net cash flows fully benefits from this more stable structure, and the Net Present Value of Global Atomic’s share rises to approximately USD 1.67 billion.

1.2.3 Considerations on the economic results of the Dasa Project

Revisiting the opening statement of this article, it is important to reiterate that numerous exogenous and endogenous factors can significantly influence the current scenario, potentially altering outcomes even in a radical way. Nevertheless, understanding where we stand today and how outcomes may unfold if the company’s expectations materialize is essential to properly assess the investment and to deliberately define potential exit strategies.

From this perspective, the focus of the results has not been placed exclusively on the project’s Net Present Value, but above all on the trajectory of annual cash flows, which represent the key variable through which the market tends to progressively reassess the economic attractiveness of a mining asset over time. While the Net Present Value remains a necessary reference metric, in assets characterized by such a long mine life its explanatory power is inherently limited: cash flows generated in the later years of the project are so heavily discounted that their contribution to NPV becomes marginal, and eventually almost negligible, despite remaining economically meaningful in absolute terms. For this reason, the analysis of annual net cash flows is essential, as project perception depends not only on the discounted aggregation of value, but also—and often primarily—on the visibility, consistency, and durability of cash generation over time.

The second year of production, namely 2029 (assuming that the timelines communicated by Stephen Roman are met), marks the beginning of the most profitable three-year period of the entire mine life. During this phase, several favorable factors converge simultaneously: taxes are effectively zero due to the previously described tax shields, peak production is reached, and operating costs settle at their lowest levels across the entire project life cycle.

Within this window, 2029 represents the absolute peak year in terms of post-tax cash generation, with net cash flows reaching the upper end of the 260–340 million USD range. In the subsequent two years, post-tax cash flows remain slightly lower than the 2029 peak but still firmly within this range, and continue to represent the most profitable years of the project thanks to the combined effect of high production levels and the persistence of the tax exemption regime.

Considering Global Atomic’s 80% ownership stake, the portion of cash flow attributable to the company therefore amounts to approximately 210–270 million USD in 2029, while remaining somewhat lower—but still exceptionally strong—in the following two years, which together form the most value-accretive phase of the mine’s life.

On this basis, each investor can construct their own valuation assumptions. As a methodological choice, no explicit price targets are provided, in order to avoid these figures being interpreted as point forecasts rather than as simple scenario exercises.

For completeness, it is worth recalling that the current number of shares outstanding is approximately 399 million, while the fully diluted share count—assuming the full exercise of all outstanding and exercisable warrants—would rise to approximately 593 million shares. Starting from these figures, it is possible to estimate a theoretical share price by dividing the annual cash flow of interest by the expected number of shares outstanding at a given point in time, and subsequently applying the P/E multiple deemed plausible for the sector over the medium term.

As a reference point, the average P/E multiple for the mining sector is around 20x. For the uranium sector, however, identifying a reliable average is more challenging, given the extremely limited number of companies with positive and stable cash flows over time. The two largest uranium producers operated by Western companies, Cameco and Paladin Energy, currently trade at markedly elevated valuation levels, with Cameco showing a price-earnings ratio of roughly 100x and Paladin reporting negative earnings, alongside a forward P/E estimated at around 60x for 2026; needless to say, were Global Atomic to approach even remotely comparable multiples, its implied valuation would reach levels that are difficult to conceive today.
For this very reason, the analysis of annual cash flows plays a central role: it allows each reader to independently construct their own valuation scenarios, adjusting multiples across different phases of the cycle and according to personal expectations regarding the evolution of the uranium market.

In this way, the analysis provides all the necessary tools to estimate a range of possible price targets consistent with the project’s economic results and with different market scenarios, while leaving the final investor with full freedom of interpretation.

1.2.4 Exceptional profitability for the Nigerien government

A final, fundamental element for understanding the risk structure of the Dasa Project concerns the extraordinary level of profitability generated for the Government of Niger, a factor that is often overlooked in market discussions but is central to assessing the real likelihood of adverse scenarios such as asset nationalization.

By aggregating taxes, royalties, and the share of profits indirectly retained within the local economic system, the total cash flows accruing to the Nigerien state reach levels of absolute significance. Under the declining production case, the cumulative value over the life of the mine (including taxes, royalties, and the 20% profit share) amounts to approximately USD 1.6 billion in the 85 $/lb scenario, USD 1.9 billion at 95 $/lb, and USD 2.35 billion in the 110 $/lb scenario. Under the second case—consistent with the company’s stated strategic objective of maintaining a stable production level of 4 million pounds per year—these figures increase further to approximately USD 2.25 billion at 85 $/lb, USD 2.64 billion at 95 $/lb, and over USD 3.26 billion in the 110 $/lb scenario.

Figures of this magnitude take on even greater significance when viewed in relation to the size of the Nigerien economy. Relative to the country’s GDP, the Dasa Project would represent one of the most important single economic contributions within the entire national industrial system, not only in terms of direct fiscal revenues but also as a lever for structural development. The project foresees the employment of several hundred local workers during the operational phase, with a broader employment multiplier—encompassing construction, services, and supplies—approaching several hundred additional jobs. This makes the asset deeply embedded in the country’s economic and social fabric.

In light of these elements, it becomes legitimate to ask a key question: what would be the real economic incentive for the Nigerien government to nationalize a project of this kind once it is in production? Nationalization would imply relinquishing not only multi-billion-dollar, recurring cash flows, but also the technical, operational, and financial expertise provided by Global Atomic—an indispensable component for operating a uranium mine within a highly regulated international environment. Moreover, the project would serve as a strategic showcase for Niger: a concrete example of how foreign capital can be attracted while preserving national sovereignty and reducing the country’s historical dependence on neo-colonial asset structures.

From this perspective, the more extreme hypotheses sometimes put forward by the market—such as a nationalization aimed at transferring control of the asset to third powers—appear even less rational. Such a scenario would be economically counterproductive, politically destabilizing, and profoundly inconsistent with the country’s long-term incentives, particularly given the systemic value that the Dasa Project could assume for Niger’s development.

This line of reasoning ties directly back to the guiding thread of the entire article: the objective is not to predict the future, but to observe how probabilities are changing. When the economic benefits for all parties involved—and especially for the host government—are quantified rigorously, it becomes evident that profitability of this magnitude drastically reduces the probability of outcomes that would be destructive to project value. It is precisely in this gradual, yet measurable, shift in perceived probabilities that one of the main keys lies for interpreting the current misalignment between Global Atomic’s intrinsic value and its market value.

Once this point is clarified, the focus shifts to the zinc recycling joint venture in Turkey with Befesa, in order to better understand the company’s industrial value and to attempt a coherent valuation of Global Atomic’s equity stake.

2.0 Turkish Befesa zinc recycling joint venture

The final missing piece of the analysis concerns the zinc recycling joint venture in Turkey developed together with Befesa, namely Befesa Silvermet İskenderun Çinko Geri Kazanım A.Ş., in which Global Atomic holds a 49% ownership stake and Befesa the remaining 51%. Understanding the real economic value of this activity is essential to complete a coherent estimate of Global Atomic’s overall intrinsic value and to compare it meaningfully with the company’s current market capitalization. Only by incorporating this asset into the valuation is it possible to form a more accurate picture of the company’s current position and its potential medium- to long-term development trajectories.

2.1 Why this joint venture is accounting-wise “atypical” and why Net Income can be misleading

The Turkish joint venture between Befesa and Global Atomic is often treated as an asset that can be easily interpreted “at a glance” through the published IFRS results and, in many market analyses, is implicitly or explicitly considered to have little to no standalone value. In reality, especially during the years in which Turkey entered a hyperinflationary regime, the as reported financial statements incorporate highly distortive components that make net income—and, to some extent, even some underlying line items—poorly representative of the business’s true economic performance. The source of this distortion is structural and lies in the very nature of the joint venture.

The plant operates physically in Turkey, and many operational dynamics therefore take place in Turkish lira, but the activity is embedded within a global industrial value chain. The zinc concentrate produced is sold to international smelters at prices linked to global benchmarks such as the LME, and revenues are effectively denominated in US dollars. At the same time, the joint venture frequently uses USD-denominated debt and credit lines, while a significant portion of operating costs—personnel, services, part of utilities and logistics—is incurred in local currency.

From an economic perspective, this combination is relatively intuitive: when the Turkish lira depreciates, part of the local cost base tends to weigh less in dollar terms, while revenues remain anchored to the global metals market. However, IFRS accounting representation does not reflect this economic intuition, as it strictly follows the logic of the functional currency and, in more recent years, that of hyperinflation accounting.

IAS 21 requires each entity to identify its functional currency, defined as the currency of the primary economic environment in which it operates. For a plant located in Turkey, with a predominantly local supply chain and operating structure, the functional currency is the Turkish lira. This entails a crucial consequence: even if revenues and debt are denominated in US dollars, for IFRS purposes all transactions must initially be translated into TRY and, at the end of each reporting period, foreign-currency monetary items—such as USD-denominated debt and cash—must be remeasured at the closing exchange rate, with the resulting exchange differences recognized in the income statement.

When the Turkish lira depreciates, the TRY value of USD-denominated debt increases significantly; the same applies to USD cash balances. However, when the joint venture is in a net debt position—as is the case for the JV—the increase in the book value of debt more than offsets the revaluation of cash, resulting in net accounting FX losses. This step is essential for a correct interpretation of the numbers: such losses do not indicate that the company is “losing dollars”, but simply that, when expressed in Turkish lira, the book value of the net monetary position deteriorates due to exchange rate movements. If the joint venture earns revenues in USD and repays its debt in USD, its real economic capacity depends on dollar-denominated cash flow generation and industrial margins, not on the accounting translation into TRY.

Adding to this dynamic is the fact that Turkey is classified as a hyperinflationary economy. As a result, financial statements must be restated under IAS 29, and a Monetary Gain/Loss line item appears on the net monetary position. This is a purely accounting measure that captures the effect of the loss of purchasing power of the currency on monetary assets and liabilities. The final outcome is that, in a hyperinflationary context, the income statement becomes a hybrid: alongside figures that describe real industrial performance—revenues, operating costs, and EBITDA—there emerges a monetary component that grows with Turkish lira inflation and tends to compress reported net income, making financial statements appear weak even when, from an operational standpoint, they are not.

2.2 Method of analysis: separating operations from distortions and constructing an “adjusted” Net Income

To read the joint venture in a way that is useful for valuation, it is necessary to separate two distinct levels of analysis.
The first is the real economic–operational level, where volumes, prices, plant efficiency, energy costs, inputs (EAFD), logistics, and industrial margins matter. Here, the key metric is EBITDA, which tracks the zinc cycle and the plant’s productive capacity in a coherent manner.
The second is the monetary accounting level, which includes FX effects on USD-denominated debt and cash translated into TRY, IAS 29 Monetary Gain/Loss, and tax volatility driven by reporting mechanics. These are figures that largely describe IFRS mechanics in a context of currency depreciation and hyperinflation, rather than the industrial quality of the asset.

From this distinction arises the methodological approach: reconstructing an adjusted Net Income alongside the “as reported” figure. In practice, the analysis starts from the reported results and isolates those components that do not reflect the industrial performance or the cash economics of the asset (FX effects on debt and cash clearly induced by translation into TRY, and the IAS 29 Monetary Gain/Loss). The objective is not to neutralize Turkish macro risk or to “beautify” the accounts, but rather to avoid judging an industrial plant on the basis of metrics that primarily capture accounting and monetary effects.

Figure 4: Economic results of the JV with Befesa

Looking at the chart, all line series are plotted against the left-hand axis and expressed in USD millions, while the green bars representing costs refer exclusively to the right-hand axis. It becomes clear that the adjusted economic results describe a reality that is substantially different from what emerges from the IFRS figures alone. Against revenues that remain high and relatively stable, at around USD 40 million per year, EBITDA shows a progressive recovery after 2023, a year heavily penalized by extraordinary events related to the earthquake in Turkey. In 2025E, EBITDA returns to levels close to USD 18 million, improving compared to the previous two fiscal years, while adjusted net income is not only positive but also steadily increasing. The “E” designation reflects the fact that the final quarter has been estimated in line with the performance of the first three quarters, consistent with the company’s guidance and expectations communicated in its most recent disclosures.
The comparison between Net Income “as reported” and adjusted Net Income therefore highlights how the apparent weakness of the accounting results is largely attributable to monetary and hyperinflation effects, rather than to a deterioration in the plant’s industrial performance.

2.3 Evidence from costs and valuation implications

The second chart – focusing on cost efficiency – is crucial because it provides quantitative evidence that completes the picture. If Turkish inflation had truly been destructive for the JV, one would expect a persistent increase in unit costs in USD (cost per lb) and a structural compression of industrial margins. Instead, the reconstruction shows a counterintuitive yet highly informative dynamic: unit costs per pound produced/sold decline from 2021 to 2025, despite one of the most extreme inflationary environments in the world. This trend is consistent with a progressive improvement in operational efficiency and cost management, within a structure where a significant portion of expenses is incurred in TRY and does not increase in USD terms at the same pace as nominal inflation, partly due to currency depreciation, while revenues remain anchored to global benchmarks.

Figure 5: Disconnect between Turkey’s hyperinflation and the decline in costs for Befesa

A direct comparison between Turkish inflation and the cost dynamics of the Joint Venture makes the distortion embedded in the financial statements even more evident. Between 2021 and 2025, cumulative inflation in Turkey amounted to approximately +590%, meaning that an item costing 1 Turkish lira in 2020 now costs almost seven times as much. Over the same period, however, the Joint Venture’s selling costs, measured per million pounds of processed zinc, declined from roughly USD 2.1 million to USD 1.0 million, corresponding to an overall reduction of more than 50%. In compounded terms, this translates into an average annual decrease in costs of about 17%, in stark contrast to a macroeconomic environment characterized by explosive price growth. This divergence between local inflation and unit cost trends demonstrates that Turkish hyperinflation has had a predominantly accounting-driven impact, while the real operating performance of the Joint Venture has become progressively more efficient.

A key point follows from this evidence: Monetary Loss is real as an accounting line item, but it is not a reliable indicator of industrial profitability.

With a 2025 EBITDA in the order of ~USD 18–20 million (based on an annualization consistent with 2025 results), it becomes possible to apply market multiples under both a neutral scenario and a more bullish scenario linked to the zinc cycle, thereby deriving a valuation range for the JV and, by extension, an estimate of the value of the 49% stake held by Global Atomic.

In summary, the Joint Venture is not an asset whose industrial quality can be assessed on the basis of IFRS Net Income volatility or weakness. Its accounting representation has been heavily influenced by exogenous and regulatory factors—functional currency in TRY, hyperinflation, remeasurement of USD-denominated debt and cash, Monetary Gain/Loss and related tax effects—which have ultimately obscured the underlying economic dynamics. Once the real operating economics of the plant are isolated, what emerges is an activity that tracks the zinc cycle coherently through revenues and EBITDA, that has recovered operationally after extraordinary shocks, and that shows a progressive improvement in industrial efficiency.

In this context, asset valuation must necessarily rely on normalized operating metrics. For the metal recycling sector and comparable industrial assets, market multiples typically cluster around ~7x EBITDA in a neutral scenario. Applying this benchmark to an EBITDA in the range of USD 18–20 million yields an estimated Joint Venture valuation of approximately USD 125–140 million. Under a more favorable scenario—consistent with an upswing in the zinc cycle or greater cash flow visibility—the application of higher multiples would lead to a materially higher valuation range.

Not coincidentally, Global Atomic’s CEO, Stephen Roman, has repeatedly stated that the company would consider selling its stake in the Joint Venture only at a valuation of at least 10x EBITDA, a level implying a total asset value in the order of USD 180–200 million. This reference provides a clear indication not only of management expectations, but also of the asymmetric upside embedded in the asset under more supportive market conditions.

Finally, it is important to frame this valuation within a broader macroeconomic context. The zinc market remains tightly linked to the global industrial cycle, and industrial materials still appear undervalued relative to energy commodities, despite the ongoing commodity super-cycle. The combination of structural underinvestment, demand driven by the energy transition, and a potential cyclical recovery in industrial activity suggests that a rise in zinc prices over the coming years is not an unreasonable assumption.

In such a scenario, the JV’s ability to translate higher prices into incremental EBITDA would render valuations based on current multiples conservative, further strengthening the potential contribution of this asset to Global Atomic’s overall value in the medium to long term.

3.0 Conclusions on the valuation of the company

After estimating the intrinsic value of the Dasa Project through the analysis of cash flows and Net Present Values under different price and production scenarios, the final step consists in comparing these values with the valuation currently assigned to the company by the market.

As discussed previously, starting from a recent average market capitalization of approximately CAD 275 million (around USD 200 million), subtracting USD 15 million of cash and adopting a prudent valuation of USD 60 million for the Joint Venture with Befesa, the residual value that the market currently appears to attribute to the uranium mining business — and therefore effectively to the Dasa Project — amounts to approximately USD 125 million.

This figure can now be directly compared with the Net Present Value of Global Atomic’s 80% stake calculated across the different scenarios.

3.1 First case: declining production profile

In the most conservative case, which reflects the original production profile of the Feasibility Study, the Net Present Value of Global Atomic’s stake amounts to:

approximately USD 959 million in the USD 85/lb scenario
• approximately USD 1,122 million in the USD 95/lb scenario
• approximately USD 1,388 million in the USD 110/lb scenario

Comparing these values with the implied market valuation of USD 125 million, the following emerges:

at USD 85/lb, the NPV of Global Atomic’s stake is about 7.7x the market valuation; the market is therefore pricing roughly 13.0% of intrinsic value;
• at USD 95/lb, the NPV is about 9.0x the market valuation; the market is pricing roughly 11.1% of value;
• at USD 110/lb, the NPV is more than 11x the market valuation; the market is pricing roughly 9.0% of value.

Read through a probabilistic lens, this relationship suggests that, under the Feasibility Study production scenario, the market is implicitly assigning a probability between 9% and 13% to the full economic realization of the Dasa Project.

3.2 Second case: steady-state production at 4 million lbs until end of life

In the second case, which reflects the industrial scenario repeatedly indicated by the company as its long-term objective — namely achieving production of 4 million pounds per year and maintaining this plateau until end of mine life, including the conversion of Inferred Resources — the Net Present Value of Global Atomic’s stake increases further, reaching:

approximately USD 1,078 million in the USD 85/lb scenario
• approximately USD 1,338 million in the USD 95/lb scenario
• approximately USD 1,668 million in the USD 110/lb scenario

In this case, the comparison with the USD 125 million implied valuation shows that:

at USD 85/lb, the NPV of Global Atomic’s stake is about 8.6x the market valuation; the market is pricing roughly 11.6% of value;
• at USD 95/lb, the NPV is about 10.7x the market valuation; the market is pricing roughly 9.3% of value;
• at USD 110/lb, the NPV is more than 13x the market valuation; the market is pricing roughly 7.5% of value.

In probabilistic terms, this implies that under the more ambitious industrial scenario — fully consistent with the company’s stated strategic objectives — the market is implicitly assigning a probability of success between approximately 7% and 11%.

The outcome of this comparison should not be interpreted as a forecast of the future, but rather as an exceptionally clear snapshot of the expectations that the market is currently embedding in the price. Returning to the concept that opens this article, quoting Howard Marks, the objective is not to guess what will happen, but to understand where we are in the cycle and how probabilities are shifting. It is precisely in this sense that the gap between calculated value and priced value becomes meaningful.

Regardless of the scenario considered, the market today appears to assign to the Dasa Project a valuation consistent with a very low probability of full production start-up, attributing only marginal weight to the intrinsic economic value already estimated. Virtually no value, however, seems to be assigned to the growth potential linked to the evolution of the production profile, the expansion of the resource base, or a sustained increase in uranium prices to levels significantly higher than those currently prevailing and assumed in this analysis. In other words, the current stock price still reflects a scenario in which uncertainty dominates the narrative more than the long-term industrial trajectory.

That said, it is precisely on this front that a series of structurally relevant changes have emerged in recent months, directly affecting the distribution of probabilities. The Dasa Project had been awaiting a key inflection point for more than two years: approval by the DFC Credit Committee. This step does not represent merely a financial milestone, but a political and strategic signal of primary importance, especially when viewed within the broader context of the ongoing transformation in the United States around supply-chain security and critical materials.

Several converging elements further reinforce this framework: the new direction of the DFC under the leadership of CEO Benjamin Black, the fund’s increasingly explicit orientation toward strategic investments in raw materials, and a US regulatory environment that in recent years has significantly expanded the agency’s operational perimeter and mandate precisely in matters of national security and critical asset development. Added to this are public statements and positions taken by leading political figures in the United States — from Donald Trump to Marco Rubio — who have emphasized the importance of relations with Niger and the strategic role of African resources in the new geopolitical balance.

From the Nigerien side, the Dasa Project represents a crucial industrial infrastructure, not only for uranium production but for the country’s long-term economic development, in a context rich in strategic resources and in need of structural investment. Financing and bringing into production a project of this scale would allow Niger to play a more central role in the global critical materials landscape, further strengthening the alignment of interests among the parties involved. It is in light of these elements that the comparison between intrinsic value and market value acquires a dynamic dimension.

If an investor believes that the probability of success of the project is lower than that currently implied by the market, or that the valuations presented in this study of the Dasa Project’s economics are excessively optimistic, then Global Atomic will inevitably appear overvalued at current prices.

If, on the contrary, one believes that the probabilities implicitly discounted by the market are now too low relative to the structural changes that have taken place, or that the adopted valuations are conservative by construction, then the company may appear significantly undervalued.

Ultimately, this analysis does not provide a definitive answer, but rather offers a quantitative and conceptual framework to understand how the market is pricing risk today — and leaves to each reader the responsibility of deciding whether, and how, those probabilities are changing

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